This paper by the Foreign Office planning committee considers the options of either a pro-Arab or a pro-Israel policy. It states:
“Neither…is practicable. A pro-Arab policy would be unacceptable to British public opinion and opposed by the US government. A pro-Israeli policy would destroy all hopes of preserving British economic and political interests in the Arab Middle East… A pro-Arab policy in any thoroughgoing form would… be hard or impossible to adopt: (a) because of British public and political commitment to Israel as an ideal and the political force of support for Israel in the country; (b) because of the pressure which the United States government undoubtedly exert on HMG to keep us in line in any public pronouncements or negotiations on the dispute”.
The paper then considers middle options. The first is “active pursuit of a settlement with disassociation from the US” and, another, “active neutrality”. The first would mean the government doing “all we can to promote a settlement but without running the risk to our world-wide interests that would be involved in actively disassociating ourselves from the US position”. This has advantages and disadvantages but the first disadvantage is that “as long as we are associated with the US government in active policies toward the dispute, we shall confirm the Arab belief that we are pro-Israel”. The second option of “active neutrality” would mean “we should have to say and do things the US government did not like and to be more pro-Arab (or at least less pro-Israeli) than the Americans”. The disadvantages of this are the damage “to our world-wide relationship with the US”, that it would be criticised by some public opinion in the UK, that UK “could not affect the power structure of the conflict” (ie, have much influence) and that “there is no prospect of a European political entity” playing a “third force” role.
Therefore the paper argues for “the low risk policy”, described as “the less continuously active variant” of the last option above. “This policy should mean, in practical terms, that our efforts should first and foremost take the form of private pressure upon the US to do all in their power to bring about a settlement”. This would mean UK would have a “strictly limited role” and “modest contributions and not peace plans should be our aim”, keeping doing business with Arab world, including arms sales, and maintaining links with Israel, especially commercial.
The conclusion was that:
“In terms of the national interest, there would be much to be gained by adopting a thoroughgoing pro-Arab policy… It would, however, be difficult to defend such a policy on grounds of principle and it would be extremely unpopular in this country. The US government would dislike it intensely and oppose it strongly if it entailed (as logically it should) showing sympathy for the Arab point of view in the international effort to help bring about a settlement. It would be incompatible with support for, or even acquiescence in, the US position in the quest for a settlement”.
The paper rules out an openly pro-Israel policy, and considers the option of active pursuit of a settlement in alignment with the US, concluding:
“Our almost total lack of influence on the combatant countries means that our capacity to contribute to progress toward a settlement is very limited. We cannot make even that modest contribution effective (or convince the Arabs we are doing all we can) if we remain closely associated with the US position”.
The paper also objects to the option of dissociating UK policy from that of the US, saying that “relations with the Arabs would be improved, but this would not measure up to the importance of our global relationship with the US”. It concludes, again, in favour of the “low risk” strategy.
Reference: PRO/ FCO 49/295
British policy towards Israel, the Arab states and the US, Foreign Office note, July 1970
August 28, 2008
Percy Cradock, Foreign and Commonwealth Office planning staff, to Sir Denis Greenhill, Permanent Under-Secretary, FCO, 24 July 1970
‘We start from the fact that our economic interests in the Arab world greatly outweigh those in Israel. It would be reasonable to expect that our policy should reflect this fact. It does not do so for a number of reasons, one of them the need for association with the United States over Middle East issues. Although out [sic] interests in the area are proportionately greater than those of the United States and although we are more vulnerable, we cannot afford to distance ourselves too far from the United States position without risk of injury to the general Anglo-US relationship. The United States, however, are identified with the Israeli position, at least in Arab eyes. Herein lies our dilemma, or one of them… As regards loss of our economic interests in Arab countries, it is impossible to point to specific current instances of loss attributable to our political posture alone. But this posture is the main reason why our economic interests in the Arab world are permanently at risk. And if we are to talk of potential [last word UL] trade… it is fair to argue that on the Arab side, where the economic stake is much bigger, our potential losses are much greater as a result of our attempt to take up a neutral position’.
Source: National Archives, FCO 49/305
Permanent Under-Secretary’s Steering Committee, “British Foreign Policy: Brief by the Foreign Office”, 26 January 1968
This long report is a briefing for the Foreigh Secretary’s forthcoming talks in Washington. It notes that the primary goal of British foreign policy is to make Britain economically strong, which was the reason for deciding to withdraw military forces from ‘East of Suez’. It continues:
“Positively, it demands that we should bend our energies to help to produce a world economic climate in which our external trade, our income from invisibles and our balance of payments can prosper. This demands that we should support and, where appropriate, initiate measures for freer and more expanded world trade, for tariff reductions, for the reduction of non-tariff barriers, for greater international liquidity and for satisfactory solutions to problems of international indebtedness, including that of the sterling balances… Although our entry into the European Communities has been blocked for the time being we must continue to develop our markets there, while increasing our efforts to open up new markets and making the best of existing opportunities elsewhere eg in Latin America, parts of the Far East such as Thailand, and indeed wherever devaluation has given us real competitive advantages. Negatively, we should for the time being adopt a ‘heads down’ attitude in regard to proposals which, however desirable in themselves, would throw a significantly greater strain upon our balance of payments, eg commodity schemes directed primarily to raise prices rather than at stability of markets”.
“We should work to harmonise US and European policies but so long as the objectives are in harmony we need not be shy about forward on the merits of the case different means of attaining them… We must ensure that our aid programme supports not only the developmental needs of recipient countries but also our own commercial and foreign policies… Wherever possible we should try to shape our aid programme to fit more appropriately the pattern of our trade and investment interests in different countries”.
Source: National Archives, FCO 49/13
